pclholding.com

Posture summary

Public attack surface (3 hostnames in Certificate Transparency)

Hostnames this organization published in public TLS certificates. Passive OSINT — nothing was scanned; a wildcard certificate is in use, so the real footprint may be larger.

The hostname inventory — which forgotten hosts exist and where — is part of the complete audit for this domain.

Lookalike domains (7 registered of 98 checked)

Registered permutations of this domain. Existence is a fact, not an accusation — ownership and intent are not assessed. Those able to receive mail are the ones usable for invoice fraud and phishing.

4 further registered lookalike(s), 2 of them able to receive mail. The full list, with mail capability for each, is part of the complete audit.

Recommendations

• mediumEnable DKIM

  No DKIM record was found on common selectors. Enable DKIM signing.

• mediumEnable DNSSEC

  DNSSEC signing was not detected for this domain.

• criticalReset credentials seen in infostealer logs

  Public infostealer telemetry associates 22 employee credential set(s) with this domain — passwords captured from infected devices, which bypass password policy and often session-hijack past MFA. The most recent dates from 2026-02-11. Most commonly Lumma. Force a reset for the affected services, invalidate active sessions, and check the devices themselves.

• mediumStrengthen password requirements

  80% of the exposed employee passwords analysed rate as weak or very weak. Raise minimum length and screen new passwords against breach lists.

• highMonitor lookalike domains

  2 registered lookalike domain(s) can receive mail, which is what makes them usable for invoice fraud and credential phishing. Monitor them and consider defensive registrations.