davisferber.com

Posture summary

Ransomware leak-site listings (1)

This domain is named on the public leak site of a ransomware group. A leak-site post is a claim published by the group — not a verified fact, and not a statement by this organization. Groups list victims who did not pay, overstate what they hold, and occasionally name the wrong company. What is certain is that the listing itself is public.

Leak-site postings are collected here from 2026-07-30 onwards; an earlier listing would not appear above.

Public attack surface (5 hostnames in Certificate Transparency)

Hostnames this organization published in public TLS certificates. Passive OSINT — nothing was scanned.

The hostname inventory — which forgotten hosts exist and where — is part of the complete audit for this domain.

Lookalike domains (4 registered of 126 checked)

Registered permutations of this domain. Existence is a fact, not an accusation — ownership and intent are not assessed. Those able to receive mail are the ones usable for invoice fraud and phishing.

1 of these were registered in the last 90 days, 1 of them able to receive mail. A registration that recent is the strongest public signal of intent there is: such names are usually registered days before they are used.

1 further registered lookalike(s), 2 of them able to receive mail. The full list, with mail capability for each, is part of the complete audit.

Recommendations

• highEnforce DMARC

  No enforcing DMARC policy was observed. Publish a DMARC record and move to p=quarantine then p=reject to reduce spoofing.

• mediumEnable DNSSEC

  DNSSEC signing was not detected for this domain.

• highClose risky exposed services

  1 risky service port(s) appear internet-exposed. Restrict them behind a firewall or VPN.

• criticalTreat data published on a leak site as disclosed

  This domain is named on akira's public leak site on 2026-08-25. A leak-site post is a claim published by the group, not a verified fact — but the post itself is public, and if it is accurate the data is already out. Confirm the claim, then work from the assumption of disclosure: rotate every credential that touched the affected systems, invalidate active sessions, and check your notification duties under GDPR Art. 33/34.

• criticalNewly registered lookalike domains

  1 lookalike domain(s) were registered in the last 90 days, 1 of them able to receive mail: davisfeber.com (16d). A registration this recent is the strongest public signal of intent there is — brand-new names are what invoice fraud and credential phishing are staged from, and they are usually registered days before they are used. Ownership and intent are not assessed here; the registration date is a registry fact. Report any that impersonate you to the registrar, warn finance and staff, and consider defensive registrations.

• highMonitor lookalike domains

  2 registered lookalike domain(s) can receive mail, which is what makes them usable for invoice fraud and credential phishing. Monitor them and consider defensive registrations.